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Faculty and Deans

Legal History-Unhappy Hybrid
by WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, Professorof Legal History, Marshall-Wythe School
of Law, College of William and Mary
in many constitutional propositions
which made out the case for independthe three parts in which I propose to ence and provided the framework for
discuss the subject. In the first part, a new republic. Finally, on December
I should like to review for you some 4, 1779 at the College of William and
of the significant elements of legal his- Mary, the first chair of law and "potory which have accounted for the lice" (i.e., government or public afgrowing scholarly interest in it in re- fairs) was created.
I do not recite these facts merely
cent years. Then, in the second part
-at the risk of stepping on some toes from a sense of pride. On the con-I feel it necessary to point out some trary, may I add this observation:
of the professional conflicts and am- Since the restoration of Colonial Wilbitions which have impeded progress liamsburg in the second quarter of
in the study of this fascinating sub- this century-and with an attendant
ject. After that, I shall try to con- revival throughout the scholarly world
clude on a positive note with some of articulate advocacy of Virginia's
suggestions for facilitating research in contribution to our history-there has
legal history.
been some danger that we may appear
to be trying merely to outshout the
I
claims of our sister colonies. On the
We are meeting, as you are well other hand, this fact is now generally
aware, in the area which was literally conceded: In the nineteenth century
the birthplace of some of the funda- while the South was caught in a culmental legal institutions on which the tural lag aggravated first by the InAmerican way of life has been built. dustrial Revolution and then by the
Six miles from us, at Jamestown, was Civil War and Reconstruction, Amerthe first permanent settlement in ican historiography was beginning to
America to be established within the acquire some of the features of a maframework of English legal and po- ture discipline-and it was acquiring
litical concepts. There, in 1619, con- these with an almost exclusively New
vened the first representative legisla- England orientation. As a consetive assembly in the New World-an quence, until the growth of substanassembly which for all practical pur- tial historical research in the South
poses has continued to the present. In in the past generation, there has been
Williamsburg itself, in the eighteenth a vast void between 1492 and 1621 in
century, came that flowering of po- the average American's idea of his
litical genius which then bore fruit own history.
The title which I have given to this

paper applies actually to the second of
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But in the development of twentieth-century research which has
sought to establish a balance of historical fact, there has been a tendency
for the pendulum to swing to the
opposite extreme. Thus, when the
Chief Justice of the United States several years ago used rather loose rhetoric to picture the Mayflower bringing the common law to the New
World, a chain reaction began in Virginia which ended with the fixing of
a tablet to the wall of the old Jamestown church asserting that the common law came here first. An older,
and perhaps better known, debate has
been carried on (and still continues)
concerning the claims of William and
Mary in Virginia and the Litchfield
School in Connecticut to be America's
first in the professional study of law.
These are all, really, beside the
point. It is a matter of documentary
evidence, for example, that William
and Mary's chair of law was created
by the Board of Visitors on December
4, 1779, while the Litchfield School
under Tapping Reeve generally dates
its distinguished career from 1784.
But these dates are really significant
only in demonstrating that, if neither
William and Mary nor Litchfield had
done anything about legal education,
some other agency would have, at
about that time. The real grist for the
legal history mill is, rather: What was
the nature of academic preparation
for the bar in the beginning of the
new nation-at both of these schools?
What had been the nature of preparation for the practice of law in the preRevolutionary period-what was the
degree of influence of the study by

colonials at the Inns of Court upon
colonial jurisprudence-what were
the political and social circumstances
under which legal institutions in the
United States were made independent
of England?
With these representative questions, some of the most obvious opportunities for research in legal history may be identified. How vast and
unworked the field really is may be
dramatized by this passage from the
excellent Studies in the History of
American Law, by Professor Richard
Morris of Columbia University:
The investigator of early American
law . . . has to plot his own course virtually unaided. No general treatise deals
at any length with the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries of American law.
The absence of abridgements of the reported cases makes the principal source
material more inaccessible than the Year
Books. The law reports contain material
as rich in significance for early American
law as are the publications of the Selden
Society for English legal history, and sufficient reasons exist for publishing at
least important selections from this abundant material on a scale commensurate
with the notable work of the society of
English scholars.1

To this statement of Professor Morris,
one might add the observation that
with the publication of such work as
is being done in this area, the need
and demand for much more of the
same becomes more evident. Thus the
volumes in the American Legal Records series published by the LittletonGriswold Fund of the American Historical Society only tantalize the
scholarly appetite-there is so very
much more at hand to be explored
and made available. Here in Virginia,
I Morris, Studies in the History of American Law (Philadelphia, 2d ed. 1958), 259.

LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL

Vol. 55

the gigantic project known as the past eighteen months: Our first fullColonial Records Survey is bringing scale monographic study of the essays
to us from England and the Continent by Professor Gottfried Dietze of the
a treasure-trove of documentary mate- Johns Hopkins University; an excelrials on every conceivable facet of lent annotated edition of The Federsocial, economic, political-and legal alist by Dr. Jacob Cooke of Colum-history, at which the scholar stares bia; and another edition with introwith the ravening attitude of a starv- ductory commentary by Professor
ing man in sight of a banquet.
Benjamin F. Wright of the University
To demonstrate further the propo- of Texas. Yet the activity in this area of
sition that, the better the work which constitutional history suggests at least
is done in this subject, the more in- three correlative studies which desistent the need for further work: mand attention before the extended
some months ago Professor George work on The Federalist may be said
Haskins of the University of Pennsyl- to have made its most complete convania published his superlative study tribution. There is, first of all, the
entitled, Law and Authority in Early rather obvious need to delineate the
Massachusetts, covering the period

anti-Federalist position-which, far

from 1630 to 1650 in what we all hope
is the first of several other works by
the author. But immediately it becomes more evident that we are long,
long overdue for a study which will
cover the same fundamental problems
as applied to the colony at Jamestown.
This is not by any means a demand
for a proliferation of work in one
strictly circumscribed segment of colonial legal history, but rather an emphasizing of the fact that, in the exploration of the legal beginnings of
society in these two particular colonies, with such distinct social and
economic influences at work upon
them, we shall have laid an excellent
foundation for the more general study
of legal history throughout the entire
colonial period.
Take as another example the continuing interest in the constitutional
propositions set out in The Federalist
papers-an interest which has resulted
in three independent projects in the

from being rejected by implication
with the ratification of the Constitution, almost immediately found vindication in the ratification of the Bill
of Rights. Secondly, in spite of all the
substantial work which has been done
on the essays by Hamilton, Jay and
Madison, we have yet to analyze their
papers in terms of American constitutional theory and practice. Finally,
and most importantly of all, there is
the need for a truly exhaustive study
of the origins of constitutionalism in
the American colonies, in the states
during the Revolution, and in the
growing state structure in the years
after 1787.
There are other important projects
in active operation in the field of legal
history, which are providing invaluable documentary facilities for future
research. Among these may be mentioned the Documentary History of
the Ratification of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, sponsored by
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the National Historical Publications
Commission and going forward under
the editorship of Dr. Robert E. Cushman, the distinguished constitutional
authority who was so long identified
with Cornell University.
Then there is the multi-volume history of the Supreme Court of the
United States, being financed by the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise of the
Library of Congress and being edited
by a team of scholars under the general direction of Professor Paul Freund
of Harvard University. If this is truly
a history of the court itself-rather
than a specialized discussion of constitutional law as Charles Warren's
pioneer work on this subject proved
to be-it will be an extremely valuable addition to the bookshelf of
legal history.
Perhaps most important of all as a
stimulus to scholarship in this field
are the growing number of projects
on the collected papers of a number
of important public men. The model
for all such work, of course, is the
Papers of Thomas Jefferson under the
editorship of Dr. Julian P. Boyd of
Princeton University. Among similar
projects now under way, which have
a special meaning for the legal historian, are the James Madison papers,
jointly sponsored by the University of
Virginia and the University of Chicago; the Adams family papers sponsored by the Massachusetts Historical
Society; the papers of Alexander
Hamilton and of John Jay, both being edited at Columbia University;
the papers of Henry Clay at the University of Kentucky; and the papers
of John Calhoun at South Carolina.

In something of an aside, I might
observe that it is particularly fitting
when the papers of such significant
figures are edited under the sponsorship of the college or university with
which they were identified. Thus,
Dartmouth College, which owes something to Daniel Webster, is undertaking the project involving the papers of that statesman. Similarly, we
have been working at William and
Mary for several years to clear the
way for a project on the papers of
John Marshall-one of the chief national figures on the list which the
National Historical Publications Commission urges be considered for comprehensive editorial treatment. I shall
refer to the Marshall project in more
detail when I come to the second part
of this paper.
There are, of course, innumerable
regional studies demanding early attention in the broad field of legal history. Professor W. W. Blume of the
University of Michigan a number of
years ago demonstrated the important
source materials to be searched out,
and the significant facts to be gathered therefrom, in reference to the
evolution of territorial law on the
frontier. It is a reproach to legal
scholarship that his pioneering lead
has not been followed. How much we
still need to know about the development of the civil law system in Louisiana, and the processes of its transition under the influence of the
Americanized form of the common
lawl How much is to be found out
concerning the Spanish legal influence
in the American Southwest, about the
heterogeneous influences upon Cali-
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fornia legal institutions, about mineral law as it has affected the whole
law of real property in the Western
states
But there is more-far more-to
stimulate the scholar confronting this
subject. Professor Willard Hurst of
the University of Wisconsin, one of
the most dynamic and original thinkers on legal history, recently pointed
out four major needs for large scale
research, which may be paraphased
as follows:
1. The significant developments in the
evolution of our law reflected in the
legislative, executive and administrative
processes-particularly in the twentieth
century. Correlatively, the contributions
of the organized bar to the legal evolution, and the social effect of laymen's attitudes toward law and law enforcement.
2. The general study of the interplay of
legal and economic trends.
3. The broad effects upon law of elemental social forces in American life during its periods of major adjustment,
e.g., in the Jacksonian period, during
and after the Civil War, and in the
Great Depression of the 1930's.
4. Correlative with the last two-and
to use Professor Hurst's own felicitous
phraseology-"legal history should treat
as critical themes the impact of social
inertia and social drift." The impact of
empirical-or worse, irrational-legislation upon significant social problems
created some remarkable legal propositions with which teacher, practitioner
and jurist have had to deal.2

The foregoing examples will suffice
to demonstrate that the fields are indeed white for the harvest, but the
workers are few. The signs of growing
activity in legal history should be a
matter of encouragement, although
for some, like the English scholar A.
K. R. Kiralfy, there is now more than
ever ground for despair. He says:
2 Hurst, The Law in United States History, 104 Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 523-4 (1960).

At the present day, more and more new
subjects are establishing their claims to
study, while at the same time the disparate and disjointed rules of modern
statute law require little background in
basic traditional principles . . . . Ultimately the law of today will take its
place as the stuff of legal history, just
as the broader analysis of its rules will
form the subject-matter of jurisprudence.
By that time, however, there will be few
legal historians to deal with it.3

May I suggest that the objectives
listed as priorities by Professor Hurst
sufficiently dispose of the dilemma
suggested in

the latter part of Professor Kiralfy's statement. Multiplicity

of contemporary legal subjects is unquestionably a problem of today's law

school, but it must not be allowed to
prolong the frustration

with which

the study of legal history has long
been met in

the law school. As for

legislation, it has already proliferated
to a

degree that requires its study

now as the stuff of legal history. The
effects of the executive and admin-

istrative processes have been manifest
for a much longer period than even

the lawyer seems to realize. In short,
legal history is not an excursion in
antiquarianism by any means-refer,
for example, to the extremely stimu-

lating new book by Professor Karl N.
Llewellyn of the University of Chicago, on The Common Law Tradi-

tion: Deciding Appeals. The legal historian, like the general historian, has
something of incalculable practical
value to tell the whole of the legal

profession, if it will but give him the

opportunity to gather and study his
material.
A few of the problems which stand
3 A. K. R. Kiralfy, English Legal History
(London 1957) V.
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in the way of legal history will be discussed in the second section of this
paper.
II
There are apparently three major
frustrations which bedevil the pursuit
of legal history. These are discussed
in more detail below, but may be summarized here as follows:
1. Administrative apathy, either at
the top institutional level, or at the
law school level, or both.
2. Professional jealousies, particularly virulent between the lawyers
and the historians, but only slightly
less pronounced between these two
groups and the political scientists.
3. Confusion of concepts as to the
definition, objectives and functions
of legal history.
Turning to the first of these problems-administrative apathy-it will
be discerned in two forms. There are
the cases where the subject is ignored
altogether; it has never been offered,
or has died of neglect, or has been
dropped in favor of some new specialty. This form of the problem probably can be dealt with only when the
second form has been resolved. In
the second form, the course is offered,
but no supporting program of research in this area has been developed
or is in prospect. The course is simply
an elective-and an elective in that
category of optional courses which is
only taken in the last desperate effort
to fill out the required number of
hours.
Now-this is the real crux of the
problem. There are enough scholars

offering a legal history course that we
can properly focus upon the need for
supporting research rather than starting with a missionary effort to get the
subject recognized. A cursory examination of law school catalogs indicates that probably 25 per cent of
them list a course in legal history. But
it is another question when one seeks
to learn from the catalog (if one ever
learns anything from a catalog)
whether a specialist in the subject has
been developed on the faculty,
whether the course is complemented
with an appropriate research program, and whether-something which
should be of particular interest to this
meeting-a definite portion of the
law library acquisitions program is
earmarked for legal history materials,
primary as well as secondary.
In the third part of this paper, I
shall try to demonstrate how legal history is a subject which is particularly
apt for use in the small law school or
the regional law school as well as for
the major school offering an exhaustive curriculum and research program.
But before reaching that point we
must recognize fully the problem here
under consideration; perhaps it can
best be stated by quoting-from a
leading law teacher who has been assured that he will be anonymous-his
concept of the problem:
The missionary role I see for legal historians is to campaign to introduce some
dimension of time into the thinking and
interests of their able young colleagues
working in corporations, taxation, trade
regulation and other staples of the curriculum. We teach the law we teach in
our schools today in a shamefully shallow time perspective, and too little that
has been done in legal history concerns
the development of substantive public pol-
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icy, too much time has been fastened on
the inner housekeeping of the courts.
There is little in the output of legal history publication to enlist recruits to the
field; if most of the product is second or
third rate, it is not surprising that firstrate men are not stirred to think that
they might find fulfillment themselves in
pursuing their interests in time dimension.

This sentiment has been rather strikingly echoed by the independent observations of several other eminent
law teachers; the tenor of their observations is (1) that the problem of
legal history is an extension of or consequence of the generally limited,
pragmatic concept of the teaching of
law subjects as a whole; and (2) that
legal history itself is handled by men
who do not really believe that "the
future may learn from the past", (colonial Williamsburg's hopeful phrase)
or that Santayana was right in declaring that we must repeat history if
we ignore it.
As for the second of these problems
-and I am giving them in an ascending order of magnitude-it is serious
enough to have brought progress in
legal history virtually to a standstill.
Although the American Historical
Association has for a number of years
had a special program in legal history,
in which some lawyers and historians
have been able to work together, it
does not take much to disrupt the uneasy truce between the professions.
In part this is due to a crystallized
status-consciousness which plagues
both groups. You perhaps remember
the ironic commentary on the 1960
convention of the American Historical
Association which appeared in the
New Yorker:

[A professional historian interviewed by
the reporter] proceeded to divide American historians into three groups. First,
there is the "in," or "white-haired," or
"shoe" group, which can be defined as
comprising the men who attend the
smokers given by such pubishers as the
Columbia University Press, the University of Chicago Press, Macmillan, and
Knopf, and who feel at home at them.
. . . This top group consists of possibly
two hundred men .... The second group,

which embraces the overwhelming majority of American historians, consists of
excellent teachers who for some reason
just aren't eligible for the 'in' group.
Maybe they didn't attend the right universities, or maybe they lacked the proper
sponsorship, or maybe they haven't published enough. The third group is made
up of historians who have acquired rank
by the simple attrition of their colleagues, of people who staff teachers' colleges, and of men who have trouble getting and keeping jobs ....

At annual

meetings of the A. H. A., members of the
"in" group give most of the speeches,
while the "out" groups sit and listen.
Members of the "in" group who don't
happen

to be giving speeches

rarely

bother to listen to their colleagues; they
prefer to stand around and talk and
carry on their secret bargaining. . . A

If this sounds familiar, it is perhaps
because it could almost as well be a
description of the annual conventions
of the Association of American Law
Schools. At both meetings, there is
the characteristic group of young faculty members described by the New
Yorker as either vainly trying to get
the attention of a prospective employer-and here it may be said categorically that no one can equal a law
school dean in the art of what I term
the unenthusiastic handshake-or as
being convoyed by some former faculty adviser who makes the strategic
introductions for him.
Related to this is the problem of a
mystery cult which has been developed around both disciplines-i.e.,
4

New Yorker, January 14, 1961.
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only the elect (as defined by those already "in") are qualified to deal with
the specialized subject matter upon
which legal history depends. Professor
Haskins, in the introduction to his
book mentioned earlier, describes the
problem thus:
Unfortunately, the domain of the law
is terrain upon which the historian without formal legal education has been reluctant to intrude. One reason for this
reluctance has been the traditional isolation of the law from other disciplines as
a result of the professionalization of legal
study in this country. Moreover, the complexities of legal doctrine and the intricacies of legal procedure have understandably tended to deter those without
professional legal training from investigating the sources and operation of law
even in a past civilization. Yet, because
law is a social product, reflecting not
only social organization but the incidence
of political and economic pressures, the
discovery of its past particularly requires
the techniques and insights of the social
scientist. Unhappily, as Professor Mark
Howe has said, "lawyers consider the historians incompetent and irresponsible,
and the historians consider the lawyers
unimaginative and narrow." If the history of American law is to be written,
this mutual distrust must be dispelled,
and the outlooks of both disciplines combined.5

There the matter stands at the moment. One or both of two procedures
obviously need to be followed: (1)
We may encourage the training of a
very small group of specialists in both
disciplines-e.g., a law school graduate with advanced work in history
and related social sciences. This, however, breeds its own problem-the
scholar who is not accepted by either
group because he is tainted with the
characteristic of the opposition. From
this comes the description of legal history which is the title of this paper.
G Haskins, Law and Authority in Early
Massachusetts (New York, 1959), ix.

(2) Alternatively, we may seek a collaboration of a lawyer and a professional historian. Unfortunately, this
has some fundamental ideological as
well as practical disadvantages; and
to date, at least, there has been no
conspicuous example of a lion and a
lamb in these areas lying down together.
A moment ago I mentioned the interest of the College of William and
Mary in undertaking a comprehensive editorial project on the papers of
Chief Justice John Marshall. Some of
our experiences in clearing the way
for such a project illustrate the fundamental clashes of interest which
develop. First of all there is the question, is such a project primarily within the area of legal history with the
emphasis on the term "legal"--or is
the project essentially historical with
only an incidental "legal" pertinence?
By what objective standards is such a
question to be settled? Let me dispose
of this last question by simply advising that, if there are objective
standards which could be applied,
they have not yet been resorted to.
Let me further add the off-the-record
comment of one individual who
sought to aid in the implementing of
the project; he declared that of all
the scholarly editorial projects under
way or in prospect, those I mentioned a while ago-the Marshall Papers-presented "the damnedest confusion" in his experience.
Why this confusion? First of all,
note that Marshall is the only one of
the several public figures whose papers are currently being gathered,
who is primarily a legal figure. Ham-
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ilton comes closest to Marshall as being identified with the law; but Hamilton, Jefferson, Clay and Calhoun are
essentially and properly described as
political leaders. John Jay may also
fall into the category with Marshall,
but his career is not so exclusively
bound up with the law. The point is,
that from the outset of a proposed
project on John Marshall, the natural
tendency is to consider the possibility
of support for the project from the
legal profession.
I shall not take you through all the
labyrinthine avenues which we had
to follow in the course of bringing the
Marshall idea at least to a position
where it could seriously be considered
by this institution. Suffice it to report
that the first serious setback to the
project developed when the American
bar through its national agency declined to be identified with it. There
were several good and sufficient reasons why the bar could not sponsor
the project at the time; but the real
damage was done by the bar's statement that it was not interested in
legal history as such, but was committed to a research program essentially ad hoc and pragmatic and contemporary.
Now, this illustrates precisely the
apathy toward legal history as a significant element in professional legal
training and practice to which I referred a moment ago. Coming from
the practitioner rather than from the
law schools, it suggests a major reason
why the law schools generally have
the attitude that they do.
I submit that this is a tragic
development. The attitude of the
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organized bar in disclaiming any professional responsibility for the comprehensive study of a giant in the law, is
damning confirmation of the contention that the law is oblivious to its
own cultural heritage. On the other
hand, the "closed shop" attitude of
the professional historians hardly encourages the hope that collaboration
between specialists on both sides can
be attained in the near future.
Finally, as to the third-and perhaps greatest-problem bedeviling
legal history at the present: The confusion of concepts. I submit that this
problem is manifested in two independent forms:
1. There is the running dispute
between the historians (in law) and
the comparativists (in law). I prefer to describe this as the conflict
between the "horizontal" and the
"vertical" approach to the subject
-and I shall explain what I mean
by this in a moment.
2. Then there is the failure of reconciliation of two other viewpoints
of legal history: One of these I shall
term the view of legal history generically; the other, the view of
legal history as the synoptic frame
of reference for a contemporary
subject.
Before dealing with these two
forms of the problem, let us illustrate
the problem as a whole by considering some of the definitions of legal
history by which the organized efforts
in the field are being influenced. In
establishing the American Journal of
Legal History several years ago, Pro-
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Lessor Erwin Surrency of Temple University described it in these terms:
First, legal history is the study of the development of legal doctrines through
statutes, court decisions, and the opinions of any lawmaking body considered
in relation to social, political and economic history.
Second, legal history embraces the history and development of people and institutions such as courts, legislatures, law
enforcement agencies, etc.
Third, legal history should embrace the
evaluation of the contribution of judges
to the development of law. Included in
this would be biographical material, on
the lives of judges and lawyers emphasizing their professional accomplishments.
Fourth, legal history needs bibliographical information as to articles and books
on its subjects.

This is obviously a basic definition.
It suggests certain fairly orthodox
avenues of approach to a subject
which obviously has been so completely unexplored that a number of
other avenues need also to be developed. While it does not necessarily
suggest a conflict of ideas, I should
like to have your indulgence while I
quote somewhat at length from a paper by Professor Hurst, to which I
have already referred; I recommend
it in its entirety to you, as it appears
in the October 17, 1960 issue of the
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society.
Four limitations of the general product
attest the want of philosophy in the
study of North American legal history.
(1) Historians have exaggerated the work
of courts and legal activity immediately
related to litigation. (2) They have paid
too little attention to the social functions of law. (3) They have not distributed their effort with adequate response to the facts of timing and the
reality of major discontinuities in the
country's growth in relation to the uses
of law. (4) They have exaggerated areas
of conscious conflict and deliberated action, at the expense of realistic account
of the weight of social inertia and the
momentum of social drift.

Most of the business of the bar through
the nineteenth century had to do with
the property and contract affairs of clients, and most of the law of these fields
was common (that is, judge-made) law,
so that through the formative period of
our main legal tradition the focus remained on the judicial process. * * *
This bias of professional thinking was
not affected by the fact that through the
nineteenth century Congress and the state
legislatures churned out large quantities
of important legislation, or by the fact
that in great areas of policy which did
not lend themselves easily to common law
development the framework of the law
was erected mainly in statutes (as in the
law of the public lands, public education, public utilities, highways, health
and sanitation, or the organizaton of
local government). From limited beginnings in the late nineteenth century,
executive and administrative law-making
grew to great proportions alongside the
statute law. Judicial law-making was
never as exclusively important as the concentration of legal writing might seem
to show. From the 1870's on, legislative,
executive, and administrative processes
definitely became the principal sources
of formed policy. The course offerings
of even the better law schools were slow
to reflect this reality. But legal research
was even slower, with legal historians
badly lagging the field.
The bulk of legal history writing has
been about topics defined by legal categories. We have much writing about commerce clause doctrine, but little about the
meaning of commerce clause doctrine
for the development of operation of sectional or nationwide marketing organization or about the impress which such
business history may have made on constitutional principles. There is some
rather formal history of property law,
but little history of the significance of
fee simple title for types of land use, for
the private and social accounting of income and costs of alternative land uses,
or for the political and social balance
of power. There are some essays on the
history of contract law, but little or no
effort to define or appraise the meaning
that contract law had for the functioning of the market, the provision of credit,
or the allocation of gains and costs of
business venture. There are scattered
writings about the history of the mortgage, the corporate indenture, the receivership and tax law, but we lack the good
studies we should have of the historic
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tory, suggested by the foregoing quotations and by the two forms of the
problem I mentioned before that.
First, as to the confusion between
the "vertical" school, as I have called
it, and the "horizontal" school or
comparative lawyers. By "vertical" I
mean a chronological historical approach-from the origins of a legal
proposition or institution to its ultimate effects. An example would be
0
*
*
*
*
any given rule of contract or propIn the total distribution of effort, there
erty law traced back to the earliest
has been a disproportionate attention in
legal history writing to beginnings-and
records and forward to its current apto beginnings in their most obvious
plication. The comparative approach,
sense-at the expense of proper development of hypotheses concerning the main
of course, is essentially contemporary
lines of growth through to our own time.
-the study of the same rule, let us
Much attention has focused on colonial
origins, on the period of constitutional
say, under different modern jurisdicexperiment from 1776 to 1790, and on
tions. Ideally, of course, but probably
the successive frontier phases of national
expansion. I do not quarrel with the
only theoretically, there should be a
worth of attending to such formative
"vertical" approach which is also
periods taken in themselves, but only
with the tendency to fasten onto origins
"horizontal" at every chronological
without equal curiosity to follow through,
level.
Until that nimble bit of research
and with failure to see that in terms of
law's relation to gathering issues of power
can be accomplished, however, we
and social function there were other less
shall simply have to concede an equal
obvious periods of beginnings which
should also be studied. First, as an exdegree of validity to both schools.
ample of the want of follow through, it
This does not really solve the probis odd that for so many states we have
writing which with care sometimes verglem, of course-it simply evades an
ing on antiquarian enthusiasm traces the
answer.
beginnings of territorial and state courts
(once again, the excessive preoccupation
The other form of the problemwith judicial process), but little good
that which I have called the generic
writing on such basic themes as law's
relation to the creation of transportation
vs. the synoptic view-brings us back
networks, the law's response to the busiagain to the characteristically pragness cycle, or the relation of tax policy to
the fortunes of agriculture and other
matic and usually short-sighted attiextractive industries.
tude of many practitioners and all too
0 *
*
* *
many law schools. This is the attitude
Second, on the neglect of the less obvious beginnings, the most notable exthat legal history derives its primary
amples are the relative inattention to the
validity as the documentary backsharp changes in direction and pace of
social movement which came about in
ground to a current problem of law;
the 1830's, the 1870's, and the 1930's.6
that legal history is the legal history
Now as to the two major forms of of something, some element in a subthe problem of definition of legal his- ject in litigation. From there it is but
a step to the assumption that all legal
6 loc. cit. n. 2, supra, at 521 et seq.
relations of law to the growth and channeling of investment capital. There is a
good deal in print about various aspects
of the Bill of Rights, but no connected
story of the implications of civil rights
doctrines for the shifting balance of
power among various kinds of groups
and between the individual and official
and private group power at different
stages of the country's growth. Though
better than a generation has gone by
since we heard the call for a sociological
jurisprudence, legal history writing has
made little response, but continues content on the whole to let the formal headings of the law fix its subject matter.

UNHAPPY HYBRID
history is either of practical use in an
ad hoc situation, or is insufferably
pedantic. This is what I call the synoptic view; I am not sure that the
dictionary agrees with this definition
of "synoptic"-but so much the worse
for the dictionary, this may be offered
as an original contribution to knowledge.
The generic view of legal history, I
submit, while it does not solve the
problem of the vertical and horizontal
schools I have described since it applies to either of them, rather deals
with legal history as legal history
rather than as the legal history of
something. In case we lost each other
on that last sentence, this view of
legal history accommodates the project which deals with isolated particulars as well as with synthesizing
studies. It is sympathetic to the approach which deals exhaustively with
the subject within the definition set
by the researcher. It is ultimately
pragmatic, but not in the sense of the
synoptic idea I described above. But
until it gains ascendancy, the pursuit
of legal history will continue to breed
unhappy hybrids
III
Having briefly reviewed some of the
opportunities, and rather tortuously
reviewed some of the problems, let me
now quickly conclude this paper with
my few suggestions for advancing the
cause of legal history. It goes without
saying, I trust, that the necessary prerequisite for any advance is a demonstrated willingness of law schools
and their affiliated institutions to encourage the work of the specialist in

this field, to provide him with research opportunities and to include
his primary source materials among
the basic collections of the library.
The first practical opportunity
which seems apparent is for the development of first-rate regional studies.
This is what I had in mind when I
suggested a few moments ago that the
small law school and the regional law
school might well develop legal history as an important element in its
curriculum. With such an enormous
range of subjects to be investigated,
there can hardly be conceived to be
any law school which does not have
rather abundant source material at
hand for a study in depth of some
specific topic in legal history. The
local application of a given rule of
law-and, more significantly, the local factors which gave the peculiar
local coloring to the rule-is an obvious type of project within the definition of regional studies.
Secondly, there are studies auxiliary to the specialties of a given law
school. For example, since an advance
program in law and taxation is offered at William and Mary, it is rather
obvious that a number of subjects in
the history of law and economics in
taxation policy and context would be
in order. Here, again, regional studies
are in order, although the specialty
itself may be confined to the larger
law schools.
In the more distant future is a third
possibility, of coordinated projects
(there are sad connotations to the
word "cooperative") -e.g., the study
of the same subject by different scholars under different jurisdictions. This
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awaits the day when legal history has
become sufficiently developed as a
discipline to stimulate a uniform or
centralized national program. That
day, it must be admitted, is some distance in the future-indeed, the
burning question before the legal
profession at the moment is whether
the time has yet arrived for collective
efforts through national organization.
Both the promising Journal inaugurated by Temple University and the
Society organized to bring together
those interested in legal history, are
groping for a definition of their
proper functions. The fact that an
early legal history society died almost
a-borning is less an indication of lack
of interest in legal history than evidence of the lack of adequate standards of achievement, based upon
enough published research of high
significance, to persuade the best
minds in this subject that something
more can be accomplished in concert.
The quality of the work of the Selden Society in England, and of individual English scholars like Maitland and Holdsworth and Plucknett,
indicates the level at which American
research must operate. But this does
not necessarily mean that legal history research on this side of the Atlantic must restrict itself to the early
documentary materials and their interpretation, which has been the high
achievement of the Selden Society.
Rather, the opportunity for American
legal history-and the responsibility
-is considerably greater: As Morris
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of Columbia has said, we urgently
need to uncover our original source
materials-but as Hurst of Wisconsin
points out, we need equally urgently
to devote our attention to the historic
development of the law in its complete social, economic and political
context. American legal history has
twice as challenging a task, as a result.
It should be evident from what has
been said in this paper that the bibliographic problems of promoting research in legal history are among the
most demanding in the law library
field. More than for any other subject
in law, legal history requires for its
proper pursuit access to the whole
field of social science material as well
as basic documents in law itself. It is
said that when one of our leading authorities in legislation was asked, a
few years ago, to draft an exhaustive
bibliography on the subject of contemporary state constitutional problems, he responded with more than
25,000 references.
Legal history can only be studied
with ready access to the source materials of the general historian, the complete range of government publications, the personal papers and works
of leading individuals of the period
under study, plus a sympathy from
the researcher's institution which
guarantees time to work in these rich
materials. When that day arrives, legal
history will change from an unhappy
hybrid to a hardy independent branch
of legal learning.

